A majority of Americans view news organizations as politically biased, creating a strong incentive for rms to try to present themselves as impartial. This paper argues that the desire to appear unbiased leads to information loss. In the formal model, rms withhold information in an eort to appear neutral. It is shown that information loss is exacerbated by competition, policies that regulate content are welfare reducing, and that regulating the size of the market can increase the amount of information revealed. Finally, the introduction of imperfectly informed sources of news, such as blogs, can decrease the incentives for traditional news outlets to provide information, yet they may also enhance welfare when information is being suppressed.
Introduction
There is a widespread skepticism of the motivations of today's news media. A recent survey by the Pew Research Center found that 75% of Americans feel that news organizations \care more about attracting the biggest audience rather than about keeping the public informed." 1 In addition to this concern, a majority of consumers are also worried about the impartiality of their news outlets. 2;3 Six-in-ten view news organizations as politically biased. 4 Since a large majority of the public prefers to receive information without a political slant, the perception of bias creates a strong incentive for media outlets to try to appear politically neutral. 5 However, in an attempt to appear objective, news organizations may create a false balance in the news by presenting opposing viewpoints in a more evenhanded manner then the evidence warrants. News organizations often insist on a \spurious balance" and are afraid of \provoking a reaction in which they'll be accused of bias, however unfounded the charge," argues Ken Silverstein, an investigative reporter for the Los Angeles Times. \I am completely exasperated by this approach to the news. The idea seems to be that we go out to report but when it comes time to write we turn our brains o and repeat the spin from both sides. God forbid we should...attempt to fairly assess what we see with our own eyes. \Balanced" is not fair, it's just an easy way of avoiding real reporting and shirking our responsibility to inform readers." Unfortunately, heightened competition may be increasing the type of news Silverstein bemoans. Recently, the number of news providers has increased while the audience for each outlet has diminished. This has lead to an increased focus on protability that journalists claim is \seriously hurting" the quality of the news reporting. 6 The Pew Research Center quotes a Vice President of online news at a local TV station as saying, \Journalism is becoming more and more a business operation. What news stories will make our station/newspaper the most protable? This has always been part of the`business' but There are several recent studies on media bias related to this paper. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn (2006) examine the market for news when consumers receive utility from reading news that conrms their prior beliefs. Under this condition, prot maximizing rms may nd it optimal to slant their reporting towards consumers' tastes. In Baron (2006) , bias arises as journalists shift their reporting towards their preferred state. Despite competition between prot maximizing news sources, bias persists. In Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) , rms distort their reports towards the beliefs of a biased populace in order to form a reputation for quality. Consumers only wish to determine the truth, yet bias remains and potentially decreases the welfare of all market participants. All of these works provide reasons why rational rms may become biased. In contrast, the focus of this work is on how the (potential) presence of biased rms aects the amount of information revealed by unbiased rms.
Formally, this paper is related to the literature on sender-receiver games with reputation concerns. Sobel (1985) examines a model of reputation building when a single advisor has preferences that are either identical (a friend) or completely opposed (an enemy) to those of the receiver. When the friendly advisor reports truthfully, the receiver's enemy will sometimes report honestly to invest in his reputation only to misreport when the payo to deceiving the receiver is suciently large. Benabou and Laroque (1992) examines an asset market setting and extends Sobel (1985) by introducing noisy information. Morris (2001) shows that when there are partisans who want the same action taken regardless of the state of the world, even an advisor with preferences identical to those of the receiver may misreport in an attempt to enhance his reputation. 8 Like in Morris (2001) , in this work the preferences of the unbiased sender and the receiver are identical, yet distortions exist due to reputation concerns. 9 However, this paper departs from the previous literature by introducing competition among senders with unknown preferences and shows that even if reputation concerns are arbitrarily small, too much competition will lead to information suppression. Park (2005) provides an alternative rationale for how increased competition may decrease honesty in equilibrium. In his work, there are two types of agents, mechanics and a customer. The preferences of all agents are known. Each period, one of the mechanics is able to provide the customer with a benet by performing a needed repair, while the rest of the mechanics provide no benet. Prior to selecting a service provider, the customer can choose any number of mechanics to give consultations as to whom can provide the benet. Each mechanic knows who is able to provide the service. Since a mechanic only receives a benet if he is hired to perform the repair, consultants have an incentive to misreport themselves as the capable service provider. As the number of mechanics increases, it becomes less likely any agent will be the capable mechanic next period. This decreases a consultant's continuation payo from honesty and thereby decreases the maximum honesty level sustainable in equilibrium. While information revelation is decreasing in the number of experts (mechanics), it is not necessarily decreasing in the number of senders (consultants). Indeed, if three or more mechanics are consulted, full information revelation is possible when considering only unilateral deviations. The focus of this work is not on increased competition due to increased specialization, but rather increased competition due to more rms providing information, thereby lessening the value of any individual rm's report. Even in this setting, increased competition can lead to information loss.
Finally, while this work is focused on information provision, it is also related to several works that are focused on information aggregation. Like in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) , uninformed unbiased rms are subject to a \swing voter's curse". When informed unbiased rms are revealing their information with positive probability, uninformed unbiased rms strictly prefer to treat the issues equally, even in the absence of reputation concerns. Should an uninformed rm recommend one alternative over the other, it is more likely to impact the population's decision negatively rather than positively. However, the focus of this work is on the incentives for the informed unbiased rms to provide information. As the paper shows, when unbiased rms are concerned about their reputations, even if these concerns are small, informed rms will also withhold information if there is too much competition. Lohmann (1993) examines the incentives to engage in costly political action and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) examines the ability of elections to aggregate information when voters have private information. Both papers show that when information is dispersed throughout the population, even if the population is arbitrarily large, information will be (at least partially) aggregated. In contrast, this work shows that as the number of media rms gets large, valuable information will no longer be provided.
The following section discusses the primitives of the model. Sections 3 and 4 contain the analysis of the monopolistic and competitive settings, respectively. Policies regulating content and competition are analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 introduces imperfectly informed sources of news and Section 7 concludes.
Any proof not appearing in the text has been relegated to the Appendix. 2 The Model A population 10 must select between three mutually exclusive alternatives: A, B, and S. ( v H ; v L ) with probability 1 2 (1 ) ( v L ; v H ) with probability 1 2 (1 ), where v H > v L > 0. With probability , both alternatives provide a benet and with probability 1 they both cause harm. Therefore, should be interpreted as the probability that it is time for a change.
If it is time for a change, the population wants to implement either proposal A or proposal B, whichever provides the greatest benet. However, if it is not time for a change, then the status quo policy should be maintained.
Notice that this distribution rules out the possibility that the two proposals provide the same benet.
This case is not considered for two reasons. First, in terms of the model, this case is uninteresting as there is only a tension when the two proposals provide dierent benets. Second, in reality it is highly unlikely that two distinct proposals will yield exactly the same benets. Also, in order to simplify the analysis, the case in which one alternative provides a benet and the other causes harm is excluded. Introducing this conguration would simply complicate the analysis without qualitatively changing the results. Additionally, assuming the absolute values of the proposals are the same regardless of whether or not it is 10 The population is modelled as one decision maker, however it can represent any number of identical decision makers. 11 The model can easily be reduced to consider a situation in which one of two alternatives must be implemented.
time for a change also simplies the exposition without substantively altering the results. If the proposals provided dierent benets when negative than when positive, all that would change is the cuto on for which the population nds it optimal to follow a rm's recommendation when unbiased informed rms are reporting honestly.
As an example of the situations under study, consider the war in Iraq. The US government can either increase troops, decrease troops, or \stay the course". If the situation in Iraq is a disaster, then either increasing or decreasing troops can provide a benet. However, if the implemented policy is achieving its goal, then the status quo should be maintained as there is no reason to switch. If the media can credibly convey which alternative provides the highest benet, then the public can put pressure on the government to implement the optimal policy. 12 Prior to making a decision, the population receives messages from N +1 rms. Each rm i P f1; :::; N + 1g can be one of three types, i P f A ; B ; U g. A with probability 1 2 B with probability 1 2 U with probability 1 .
After learning its type, each rm observes the values of the alternatives with probability 1 and with probability observes nothing. Subsequently, each outlet sends a message from the following message space: m i P fA, B, \Equal", \Both Bad"g. Therefore, a rm can do one of four things. It can recommend alternative A be implemented, recommend alternative B be implemented, claim that the two proposals are equals, or recommend that the status quo be maintained. The population then aggregates the media's reports, updates using Bayes' rule, and selects the alternative that provides the highest expected utility.
Firms biased towards alternative A (B) only receive utility if their desired policy is implemented and are perfectly willing to sacrice their reputations in order to increase the chance their preferred outcome is realized. 13 Therefore it is assumed that these rms send message \A" (\B") with probability 1. Assuming biased types behave in this way simplies the analysis by reducing the number of equilibria that need to be considered (i.e. it rules out equilibria in which a message of \A" is construed as a recommendation for alternative B and vice versa). Moreover, the assumption is fairly innocuous since in equilibrium these rms will be acting rationally. Unbiased rms, however, care both about the implemented policy and about their reputation for being unbiased. Specically, they receive the same utility as the population from the chosen alternative, yet suer a reputation cost whenever they send message \A" or \B". If an unbiased rm sends message \A" or \B" with positive probability, then upon receipt of either message, the population will be unable to determine whether the rm is actually unbiased or whether it is biased towards its recommended alternative. However, if an unbiased rm were to treat the issues symmetrically by sending either message \Equal" or \Both Bad" it would perfectly separate from the biased types. This model can be interpreted as the rst stage of a continuation game in which a rm's ability to attract consumers is increasing in its reputation for being unbiased.
Throughout the paper it is assumed that the loss in reputation from sending message \A" or \B" is valued at c. The second section of the Appendix shows how the reputation cost can be endogenized to be the ex-post probability the population assigns to a rm being a biased type. The main results would continue to hold in this setting. Maintaining a reduced form assumption not only simplies the analysis, but also allows for stronger comparisons between the incentives to provide information and invest in reputation. Allowing costs to be endogenous places a lower bound on the value of reputation, however, as will be shown, even if reputation concerns are arbitrarily small the incentive to invest in appearance can dominate and induce rms to withhold information.
Like in all models with costless messages there exist \babbling" equilibria in which the senders message doesn't depend on the true state and the receivers decision doesn't depend upon the message sent. In this setting, these equilibria are both uninteresting and implausible, so the paper will restrict attention to informative equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which the informed unbiased sender's message conveys some information about the true state. Additionally, since there are multiple messages, there exist equilibria in which o-equilibrium path beliefs are used to articially restrict the message space. For example, equilibria in which no one sends message \A" (even biased types) because the population assigns probability one to a type being biased upon the receipt of that message. These equilibria are also regarded as implausible and ignored.
Monopoly
Suppose there is a monopoly in the market for news so that consumers receive only one message prior to making a decision. If the monopolist is uninformed, then it doesn't have any information about which alternative is best beyond the market prior. Therefore, uninformed unbiased rms will regard alternatives A and B as equals since, to the best of their knowledge, each provides the same expected benet.
Suppose for the moment that these rms report honestly by sending message \Equal". Biased rms, on the other hand, want their desired alternative implemented regardless of the state. Whether informed or uninformed, these rms will deterministically send either message \A" or \B" depending on the direction of their bias.
Consider the population's beliefs following the receipt of any report. Should the population receive message \Both Bad", then it knows this message has come from an informed unbiased rm and that the status quo should be maintained. Similarly, should the population receive message \Equal", it knows the signal has come from an unbiased rm, but has no way of dierentiating between alternatives A and B.
14 Since each alternative is equally attractive in this case, it is assumed the population randomizes equally between the two if it prefers either to the status quo. However, if an informed unbiased rm sends message \A" or \B" with positive probability, then upon receipt of either message, the population will be unsure whether the recommended alternative is indeed best, or whether the message has come from a biased rm and hence doesn't contain any information about the true state.
Notice that if alternative S is best, then an informed unbiased rm will send message \Both Bad".
This both enhances the rms reputation and induces the correct decision. However, if alternative A or B is best, then an informed unbiased rm must decide whether to invest in its reputation by sending message \Equal" or whether to try and induce the optimal decision at the cost of being perceived as potentially biased. If an informed unbiased rm sends message \A" (\B") with probability 1 when alternative A (B) is best, then the population will implement the recommended alternative if the following inequality is satised, 1 2 (1 )(1 ) 
If , the level of bias in the economy, is suciently small, then the population would implement a recommendation of A (B) if an informed unbiased rm sent that message with certainty when the corresponding proposal is best. Alternatively, should the message \Equal" be received, it must have come from an unbiased uninformed rm. Therefore, the population will choose randomly between alternatives A and B,
, alternative A (B) provides a benet in expectation and will be preferred to the status quo when no other information is revealed. If = 1 2 , then all alternatives provide the same expected benet ex-ante, while if < 1 2 , the status quo will be preferred to either alternative following a message of \Equal".
An informed unbiased rm would follow its supposed strategy if
If the rm's recommended alternative will be implemented, then it will receive v H by sending the correct message, yet suer a reputation cost by not separating from the biased types. However, if the rm sent message \Equal", this would induce the population to select the status quo if < 1 2 , or randomize equally between alternatives A and B if ! 1 2 . Notice that a deviation is most attractive when ! 1 2 since sending message \Equal" would induce a change, which is benecial, yet the best alternative would be implemented only half of the time. Unless otherwise specied, it is assumed throughout that this last inequality is satised so that if its recommendation were to be followed, an informed unbiased rm has an incentive to fully reveal its information. This leads to the following proposition. Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium in which an informed unbiased rm fully reveals its information if and only if .
Proof. As seen above when , an unbiased rm prefers to fully reveal its information since its recommendation will be followed. Additionally, biased rms have no incentive to deviate as they are getting their most desired outcome with probability 1. Finally, by sending message \Equal", in expectation an uninformed unbiased rm receives
In either case, this payo strictly dominates the expected payo from sending either message \A" or \B", and weakly dominates the payo to sending message \Both Bad". However, if > , then no such equilibrium exists. In this case, even if informed unbiased rms deterministically signal the correct alternative when it is time for a change, the population will nd it optimal to stick with the status quo following a message of \A" or \B". Since a recommendation for change would not be followed, informed unbiased rms will withhold information and treat the issues symmetrically to avoid suering the reputation cost.
If the level of bias in the economy is small, an informed unbiased rm can induce the optimal decision.
Since the proportion of unbiased types is suciently large, the population is willing to implement a recommendation of A or B as the chance of being misled by a biased rm is outweighed by the benet gained from following an informed unbiased rm's recommendation. However, if > , then information will be suppressed. In this case, even if informed unbiased rms fully reveal their information with certainty, the population will not follow a recommendation of \A" or \B" as it is too likely that this message has come from a biased rm. Therefore, since it's recommendation would not always be followed, when it's time for a change an unbiased informed rm will withhold information and treat the issues symmetrically in order to enhance its reputation.
Notice that setting = 1 2 in the expression for yields = 1. Therefore, when = 1 2 , an informed unbiased rm will fully reveal its information no matter what the level of bias in the economy. In this case, following a biased rm's report won't hurt the population in expectation since alternative A (B)
is as likely to provide a benet as it is to cause harm. Consequently, the population is willing to follow any recommendation, no matter how biased the media market. For the remainder of the paper it will be assumed that = 1 2 so that the incentive for unbiased informed rms to fully reveal their information is maximized. However, as the next section shows, even in this case, information will be withheld if there is too much competition.
N+1 Firms
Suppose there are N + 1 ! 2 rms in the market. Additionally, suppose for the moment that uninformed unbiased rms nd it optimal to report honestly by sending message \Equal". As in the case of a monopoly, if the status quo should be maintained, an informed unbiased rm will send message \Both
Bad" with probability one. This message both induces the correct decision and separates the sender from the biased types. However, if alternative A or B is best, an informed unbiased rm must decide whether to sacrice its reputation in an attempt to generate the correct decision, or whether to enhance its reputation by sending message \Equal". 15 Since, the situation in which alternative A is the best option is symmetric to the situation in which alternative B is best, the paper will focus on symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which informed unbiased rms fully reveal their information with same probability in the two states.
Consider the population's beliefs following the receipt of any message prole. 16 If the message prole contains at least one message of \Both Bad", then the population knows this message has come from an informed unbiased rm and that alternative S is the best option. However, as the next lemma establishes, if the message prole does not contain any reports indicating the status quo should be maintained, it is a best response to select the alternative that has received the most recommendations.
Lemma 1. If the message prole contains at least one message \Both Bad", the population will select alternative S. However, when the message prole doesn't contain any signals \Both Bad" the population will choose the alternative that has received the most recommendations.
Proof. See Appendix A message of \Both Bad" is fully revealing as it occurs with positive probability only when the status quo should be maintained. If there aren't any signals indicating the status quo is the best option, the population will prefer the alternative that has received the most reports since each rm is equally likely to be biased in either direction and unbiased rms never signal the incorrect alternative. If alternatives A and B have received the same number of reports, each option will be equally attractive. In this case it is assumed the population randomizes equally between the two.
Suppose alternative A provides the greatest benet. Let denote the probability the other informed unbiased rms fully reveal their information and 1 denote the probability they send message \Equal".
The benet to an informed unbiased rm from sending message \A" is given by v H v L 2 P (; ; N) 15 When it is time for a change, message \Equal" dominates both message \Both Bad" and recommending the alternative that provides v L . 16 Notice all message proles occur with positive probability. (1 )(1 )(1 )+ (1 ) 3 N 2j 1
An informed unbiased rm benets from revealing information whenever its report changes the population's decision. A rm's report is pivotal if either there are an equal number of recommendations of \A"
and \B", or if there is one more recommendation for the incorrect alternative than the correct alternative.
When A is the best alternative, message \A" is sent if either the rm is biased towards alternative A, or if the rm is informed, unbiased and reveals it's information. Message \B" is sent only if the rm is biased towards alternative B, while message \Equal" is sent if either the rm is informed, unbiased and withholds information or if the rm is unbiased yet uninformed. When its report is pivotal, an unbiased rm increases the probability the correct alternative is chosen by 1 2 , resulting in a gain of v H v L 2 .
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By selecting the alternative that has received the most support, the optimal decision rule balances the biased types as best as possible. This in turn provides the maximum incentives for informed unbiased rms to reveal their information. As the following lemma shows, an informed unbiased rm nds it most attractive to report honestly when all other informed unbiased rms withhold information.
Lemma 2. P (; ; N) is strictly decreasing in .
Proof. See Appendix
In expectation, the optimal decision rule of the population balances out the biased types. When informed unbiased rms reveal their information with positive probability, this tilts the distribution of reports towards the best alternative, which decreases the incentives to report honestly. As increases, the probability any rm's report will be pivotal decreases, as does the incentive to provide information.
This leads to the following proposition. 17 Notice this section of the model is similar to a pivotal voting model. While the decision made by the public must be a best response to the amount of information revealed in equilibrium, due to symmetry the resulting optimal cut-o is at 1 2 regardless of . Section 6 breaks the symmetry by introducing an imperfectly informed source of news. In this situation, the decision rule adopted by the population will depend endogenously on , the amount of information revealed. As assumed, uninformed unbiased rms strictly prefer to report honestly. By sending message \Equal", these rms have no impact on the population's decision. However, the expected benet from sending message \A" or \B" is negative, even ignoring the reputation costs. Uninformed unbiased agents are subject to a \swing voter's curse". Should they recommend one alternative over the other, it is more likely they will impact the population's decision negatively rather than positively. Additionally, honest reporting also dominates message \Both Bad" as sending signal \Equal" provides positive expected surplus while \Both
Bad" delivers 0 with certainty.
When reputation concerns are strong, informed unbiased rms prefer to withhold information and signal to the market that they are unbiased. When they are moderately concerned with their appearance, informed unbiased rms will randomize between revealing and withholding information and, nally, when reputation concerns are weak, they will report honestly as the potential to impact the public's decision outweighs the loss in reputation. However, as the following key result establishes, even if reputation concerns are arbitrarily small, informed unbiased rms will withhold information if there is too much competition. As established in Lemma 1, the population will select the alternative that receives the most support when there aren't any messages recommending that the status quo be maintained. Consequently, when it is time for a change and there are many news rms, the chance that one more favorable report alters the population's decision is small. This induces informed unbiased rms to withhold information rather than sacrice their reputation.
When there is a lot of competition, unbiased rms focus on their bottom-lines rather than informing the public, even if reputation concerns are arbitrarily small. In a highly competitive marketplace, there will be many biased rms creating a lot of noise. The chance any unbiased rm can cut through this noise and inform the public is exceedingly small. Since the chance its message has any impact on the public's decision is innitesimal, unbiased rms invest in their reputation rather than providing information.
Policy Procedures
Biased news organizations can negatively impact consumers' decisions both directly, by providing false information, and indirectly, by inducing unbiased rms to withhold information. However, there are many ways in which society can attempt to mitigate the eects of biased news. This section explores the welfare implications of regulations on content and competition.
5.1
Fairness Doctrine
In an attempt to ensure that media coverage of controversial issues was fair and balanced, the Federal 
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This has lead to a heated debate and in June of 2007 the House passed an amendment prohibiting the FCC from using funds to restore the Fairness Doctrine. A similar amendment, however, was blocked in the Senate and both supporters and opponents of the legislation have vowed to continue pressing the issue. 19 If the Fairness Doctrine were to be renewed, the FCC's broadcast licensees would be unable to openly support one alternative over another on any contentious issue. Therefore, in terms of the model, rms would be restricted to treat the issues symmetrically as the available message space would be reduced to m i P f\Equal", \Both Bad"g: Biased rms, however, will still be biased and will only be concerned with sending the message that implements their desired alternative with the highest probability. Since it can no longer directly recommend its preferred policy, a biased rm will now send message \Equal" with probability one. While this will not always induce the population to select the rm's desired alternative, 18 www.sanders.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=269328. 19 http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-mon fair 0730jul30,0,7056061.story it will be a message supporting a change. Additionally, should a new direction be benecial, informed unbiased rms can only signal that a change is necessary, but cannot provide any information about which alternative is better. Hence, these rms will send message \Both Bad" if the status quo is the best option, and message \Equal" otherwise. As in the previous sections, uninformed unbiased rms strictly prefer not to have an impact on the population's decision and will report honestly.
The population can now receive one of three types of message proles. Either the message prole is comprised entirely of signals \Equal" or \Both Bad", or it contains some mixture of the two. However, if the message prole contains at least one signal \Both Bad", the population knows this has come from an informed unbiased rm and that the status quo policy is the best option. Otherwise, if the message prole is comprised entirely of recommendations claiming the options are equals, after Bayesian updating, the population will nd it optimal to make a change, but has no way of dierentiating between alternatives A and B.
Therefore, expected utility under the Fairness Doctrine is given by
If it is time for a change, every rm in the economy will send message \Equal". Subsequently, the population will be induced to make a change, but has no way of determining which alternative is best. Half the time the population will choose the correct alternative and receive v H , yet the other half the time they will choose incorrectly and receive v L . If it's not time for a change, the population will correctly stick with the status quo if it receives at least one message \Both Bad". However, if it receives only recommendations for change, the population will erroneously select either A or B and lose v H +v L 2 in expectation. If the status quo alternative is the best option, the message prole will be comprised entirely of signals \Equal" only if every rm in the economy is either biased or uninformed. This occurs with probability ( + (1 )) N+1 .
Now consider the population's expected welfare without the Fairness Doctrine when informed unbiased rms reveal their information with probability . Let (; ; N + 1) denote the ex-ante probability the population selects the correct alternative when it is time for a change. In this case, expected welfare is Proof. See Appendix.
If informed unbiased rms are fully revealing their information with any positive probability, when it is time for a change the correct alternative will be chosen more often then not. This leads to the following proposition. Regulating content will not provide any benet and may cause harm. While the Fairness Doctrine removes the ability of biased rms to lobby directly for their desired alternative, it does not induce them to provide any information. Moreover, if unbiased rms are signaling the correct alternative with any positive probability, implementing the Fairness Doctrine will reduce the amount of information revealed.
Regulating Competition
Expanding the size of the market introduces a tradeo. If the status quo should be maintained, the population will do so as long as there exists at least one informed unbiased rm. Therefore, increasing the number of rms in the market reduces the probability that alternative A or B is erroneously selected when no change is warranted. However, as seen in Section 4, if there is too much competition, unbiased rms will withhold information, which reduces welfare. which is strictly increasing in N. If unbiased rms are so concerned with their reputations that they won't recommend A or B even if doing so would lead to the correct decision, then competition increases welfare.
In this case, increasing the size of the market has no impact on whether or not an informed unbiased rm reveals its information when it is time for a change, but it decreases the chance that a change is made when the status quo is optimal. If it is time for a change, the population will choose the best option if the monopolist is unbiased and informed. If the monopolist is biased or uninformed, the correct alternative will be selected with probability When there are an innite number of rms, informed unbiased rms withhold information so the population is never able to dierentiate between alternatives A and B. However, the status quo will always be maintained when it is the best option, since the probability the entire market is biased or uninformed is zero. Simple algebra reveals that the population would prefer a monopolist if
In a monopoly, there is a large chance that the entire market will be either biased or uninformed in which case the population will be frequently misled. However, if and are suciently small, this concern is dominated by the increase in welfare derived from an informed unbiased rm with incentives to report honestly.
, so that a monopolist is preferred to an innite number of rms. As seen in the previous section, when there are N +1 rms and unbiased rms are revealing their information with probability , expected utility is given by 1 2
When N is small, an informed unbiased rm will nd it optimal to provide information with probability one. The following lemma shows that when informed unbiased rms are revealing their information deterministically, the probability the correct alternative is selected when it is time for a change is nondecreasing in N. , the size of the market should be regulated. Entry should be encouraged as long as unbiased rms still have an incentive to reveal their information with probability one. Increasing competition beyond this point, however, will induce unbiased rms to withhold information, which reduces welfare.
Blogs
Many people have access to several dierent types of news sources and increasingly the public is turning to blogs to receive information. However, blogs are often less informed than the mainstream media as they have far fewer resources to investigate stories. To capture this, suppose the population has access to another source of information, the blogosphere, which is potentially misinformed. Specically, if alternative A is the best option, blogs will observe and send message \A" with probability > 1 2 and send message \B" with probability 1 . If the status quo should be maintained, blogs will transmit complete noise by sending message \A" and \B" each with probability 1 2 . 20 As in the previous sections, biased rms will deterministically signal their preferred alternative and, as seen in the following lemma, uninformed unbiased rms will strictly prefer to report honestly. Lemma 6. When blogs are present, uninformed unbiased rms strictly prefer to report honestly by sending message \Equal".
Proof. See Appendix.
When it is time for a change, informed unbiased rms must choose between signaling the correct decision and investing in their reputations as before, but now have the added benet that blogs may reveal the correct alternative.
Suppose there is a monopoly in the news market and that an informed unbiased rm would reveal its information. Should the monopolist send message \Both Bad", the population will stick with the status quo as this message is perfectly revealing. Should the monopolist send message \Equal", the population will nd it optimal to implement the alternative suggested by the blogosphere, while if the monopolist and the blogs agree on which alternative is best, the population will accept the recommendation. Should they dier, however, the population must consider the reliability of each source and will choose the alternative suggested by the monopolist if, +(1 )(1 ) , then when it is time for a change, the monopolist has the ability to send the correct message more often then the blogs. Throughout this section it is assumed that this inequality is satised so that news organizations have the capability of being more reliable.
An informed unbiased monopolist would nd it optimal to signal the correct alternative if
Notice that incentive to provide information is now reduced. Since blogs send an informative signal when it is time for a change, news organizations are less apt to do so. Specically, if
then in the absence of the blogosphere, informed unbiased rms would fully reveal their information while when blogs are present, they withhold. In this situation, the population is worse o as the probability the correct alternative is selected when the monopolist is informed and unbiased drops from one to u with the introduction of blogs.
Now consider a competitive marketplace. As in previous sections, should the population receive at least one signal \Both Bad", then the status quo will be maintained. When is large, it won't take many contradictory signals to overturn the blogs since news rms' messages are highly informative. However, as 3 0, both R() and W () 3 I, and the population becomes increasingly reliant on the blogosphere for information. As the next proposition shows, when there is a lot of competition in the news media, informed unbiased rms will withhold information so the population will rely on the blogs to dierentiate between alternatives \A" and \B". A similar argument can be used to show that P rob
, also approaches 0 as N gets large. For any > 0 and corresponding cutos, the benet to an informed unbiased rm from signaling the correct alternative approaches zero as the size of the market increases, while the cost to doing so remains strictly positive. Hence, when there are many news organizations, informed unbiased rms will withhold information.
When the news media is highly competitive, informed unbiased rms will withhold information since the chance of impacting the public's decision is outweighed by the benets gained from appearing unbiased.
Consequently, the population will turn to the blogosphere in order to dierentiate between alternatives A and B. Even though blogs are on average less informed than traditional news outlets, they will be providing a more informative, albeit noisy, signal.
While blogs may decrease the incentives for informed unbiased rms to provide information, they also strictly increase welfare when there is too much competition. As seen previously, when the news media is highly competitive, informed unbiased rms will withhold information, regardless of whether or not blogs are present. In the absence of blogs, the population will only select the correct alternative half of the time when a change is necessary. However, when the population also receives information from the blogosphere, even though they are imperfectly informed, blogs increase probability the correct alternative is chosen from 1 2 to .
Conclusion
Media outlets spend a signicant amount of resources investing in their reputation for neutrality. This paper has shown how the desire to appear unbiased can lead to information loss in the market for news. A rm that is concerned with its appearance has an incentive to withhold information in order to maintain its reputation for impartiality. Moreover, even if rms care arbitrarily little about their reputations, if there is too much competition information will get lost. When there are many voices in the market, no rm is willing to sacrice its reputation since the chance it has an impact on the public's decision is innitesimal. Additionally, it was shown that policies regulating content can be welfare reducing, while limiting the size of the market can provide an atmosphere conducive to information revelation. Finally, the introduction of imperfectly informed sources of news, such as blogs, can decrease the incentives for traditional media outlets to provide information, however they may also increase welfare if information is being suppressed.
Appendix
Proof. As noted in the text, a message of \Both Bad" is fully revealing as it only occurs with positive probability when the status quo should be maintained. Therefore in any message prole with at least one message \Both Bad", alternative S will be selected.
Suppose there are N rms in the market and the message prole contains j messages of \A", k messages of \B" and N k j messages of \Equal". Let denote the probability an informed unbiased rm signals the correct alternative and 1 denote the probability it sends message \Equal". Alternative When A is the best option, message \A" is sent if either the rm is biased towards the correct alternative or if the rm is informed, unbiased and reveals its information. The probability the correct message is sent when it is time for a change is given by 1 2 + (1 )(1 ). Similarly, message \B" is sent only if the rm is biased towards alternative B, and message \Equal" is sent if either the rm is informed, unbiased and withholds information or if the rm is unbiased and uninformed. Therefore, alternative A is preferred to B if Combining the rst and last terms and dropping the common multiplicative constant yields, When an unbiased uninformed rm sends message \Equal", it has no impact on the population's decision.
If the status quo should be maintained, the population will choose correctly unless all other rms in the market are either biased or unbiased and uninformed. When there aren't any informed unbiased rms and the status quo is the best option, the population will choose incorrectly and lose v H +v L 2 in expectation. However, as Lemma 4 shows, when it is time for a change (; ; N) ! 1 2 . Therefore, an unbiased uninformed rm strictly prefers honest reporting to sending message \Both Bad" since sending message \Equal" provides positive expected surplus.
Additionally, unbiased uninformed rms strictly prefer honest reporting to a message of \A" or \B".
By sending message \A" the rm's expected benet over message \Equal" is The third term in the expression above can be rewritten as The proof for N even is exactly analogous. The rst term is the probability less then half the biased types are biased towards the wrong alternative.
The second summation is the probability more then half the biased types are biased towards the wrong alternative, but the number of informed unbiased rms revealing information either exactly osets this dierence or creates a surplus of reports for the correct policy. . However, when i ! 1 and > 0, the second term is strictly positive, so the correct alternative will be implemented with probability strictly greater than Proof. Like when blogs are absent, uninformed unbiased rms strictly prefer message \Equal" to \Both Bad" as message \Equal" provides positive expected surplus while message \Both Bad" provides a payo of 0 with certainty. Additionally, message \Equal" is also strictly preferred to both messages \A" and \B". To see this, suppose informed unbiased rms send the correct message with probability when it is a time for a change. As seen in the text, the expected benet to providing information for an informed If alternative A is the best option, the benet to an uninformed unbiased rm from sending message \A" corresponds exactly with that of an informed unbiased rm. However, if alternative B is the best option, by sending message \A" an uninformed unbiased rm will sometimes induce the population to select alternative A when they otherwise would have implemented the correct alternative. If it is not time for a change, the expected benet to sending message \A" exactly osets the expected cost. Therefore, the expected benet to an uninformed rm from sending either message \A" or \B" is strictly less than that of an informed rm. Hence, in any equilibrium in which informed unbiased rms send the correct message with < 1; uninformed unbiased rms will strictly prefer to send message \Equal". Additionally, when = 1, R(1) = 1 and W(1) = 0, since u 1 2 +(1 ) (1 ) +(1 ) (1 ) . Therefore, when informed unbiased rms are fully revealing their information, the benet to an uninformed unbiased rm from sending message \A" or \B" over message \Equal" is 
Endogenous Reputation Costs
Suppose the reputation cost from any message is the ex-post probability the population assigns to a rm being a biased type after the true state has been realized. Since biased rms send either message \A"
or \B" deterministically, should an unbiased rm send message \Equal" or \Both Bad" it will perfectly signal its type. When alternative A is revealed to be optimal ex-post, the population will believe that any rm that has sent message \A" is biased with probability Notice for an arbitrary population size there may be multiple equilibria as both benets and costs are decreasing in . 23 However, as N gets large, the benet to an informed unbiased rm from signaling the correct alternative approaches zero, while the cost to doing so is at least 1 2 1 2 +(1 ) (1 ) . Therefore, as the number of competitors gets large, informed unbiased rms will withhold information and the main results in the text will continue to hold. 22 As seen in the text, no unbiased rm will send message \B" if A is the best option. 23 For example, when N = 2, for some parameter congurations both = 0 and = 1 constitute equilibria.
